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Holmes and the Bald Man:
Why Rule of Reason Should Be the Standard in Sherman
Act Section 2 Cases
WILLIAM J. MICHAEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
It can prohibit a firm from adding capacity in anticipation of an increase in demand for the firm’s product.1 Filing false papers with the government can run afoul of its prohibitions.2 Deceptive conduct may violate
it.3 A firm can be liable for treble damages under it for tortious conduct.4
Bribing competitors’ employees to shift business or divulge trade secrets
can get a firm in trouble under it,5 as can buying up rivals’ necessary inputs.6
That said, the United States Supreme Court and the brightest scholars
are not even sure of its purpose.7 Courts and commentators recognize their
* B.A. in Economics, The Ohio State University; J.D., The Ohio State University. Mr. Michael
practices antitrust law with Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP in Columbus, Ohio.
1. See U.S. v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
2. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
3. See Natl. Assn. of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Laboratories, 850 F.2d 904, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1988);
Intl. Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curium) (holding that exclusionary conduct was proven where
Microsoft deceived Java developers about whether using Microsoft’s development tools would make
software incompatible with rival operating systems); see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (holding that a conspiracy to spread false information about rival
product safety is anticompetitive); Am. Socy. of Mech. Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982) (same).
4. See e.g. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
5. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
6. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
7. See e.g. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 127 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that one purpose of the Clayton Act is to protect small business); Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370
U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.”); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (“The end sought was the prevention of restraints . . .
which . . . raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of
goods and services.”); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing efficiency
gains not passed on to consumers); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 107-15 (Basic Books 1978)
(total wealth maximization); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 8-22 (U. of
Chi. Press 1976) (total wealth maximization); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An
Interest-Group Perspective, 5 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. 73 (1985); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost
Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941, 948 n. 25 (2002) (“Despite the wish of economists and their
fellow travelers that the goal of antitrust be to promote overall efficiency, neither case law nor legisla-
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own limited ability to come to terms with its commands.8 Perhaps as a
result, “free market ideologues have waged war on [it] for the past thirty or
so years.”9 It has gone through substantial evolution over time,10 to the
point where it “means not what its framers may have thought, but what
economists and economics-minded lawyers and judges think.”11 A mighty
school was founded in the Midwest – Chicago – to try and add content to

tive history stands for the proposition that overall economic welfare or wealth maximization trumps
low prices.”); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213, 220 (1979) (“The primary objective of antitrust policy is to promote full and
fair market competition and to reap the benefits that competition brings with it.”); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income,
23 J. Leg. Stud. 667 (1994) (total wealth maximization); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J.
65, 68 (1982) (goal is the prevention of unfair wealth redistribution “from consumers to firms with
market power”); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219
(1988); Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 168
(2005) (“There is widespread agreement that the clearly articulated purpose of antitrust is to protect
consumers.”); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979). The
current dominant view is that antitrust laws are designed to protect consumers. See Am. Academic
Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922 F.2d 1317, 1319 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (“The modern
conception of the Sherman Act is of a statute that seeks to protect consumers from monopolistic practices rather than competitors from competitive practices.”). Monopsony may be a different story. See
Michael C. Naughton, Buyer Power Under Attack: Recent Trends in Monopsony Cases, 18 Antitrust
81, 82-83 (2004); see also Roger D. Blair & Kristine L. Coffin, Physician Collective Bargaining: State
Legislation and the State Action Doctrine, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1731 (2005) (monopsony generally).
8. See e.g. Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (“[J]udges often lack
the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence
a practice’s effect on competition.”); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 952-53 (recognizing limits of judiciary to
balance technological benefits of arrangements against anticompetitive effects); Thomas E. Kauper,
Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 Geo. L.J. 1623, 1624 (2005) (Judges
and juries “cannot define monopolization but . . . know it when they see it.”).
9. David F. Shores, Economic Formalism in Antitrust Decisionmaking, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 1053, 1093
(2005). One might identify the initial shot fired in the war as Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, supra n. 7.
10. See e.g. Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in Post-Chicago Developments
in Antitrust Law 60, 60-64 (Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, & Roger Van den Bergh, eds., 2002)
(discussing antitrust’s classical and structural eras); Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and
Practice 7 (Cambridge U. Press 2004) (describing pre-Chicago antitrust efforts as fueled “more by the
desire to restrain large firms than by the objective of increasing economic efficiency”); see generally
U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that the imposition of territorial restrictions on resellers is a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Stand. Oil Co. of Cal. v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293,
314 (1949) (holding that a practice substantially lessens competition if it can be shown that “competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.”); U.S. v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (holding that a conspiracy to eliminate competition violates the Sherman Act
regardless of the amount or importance of interstate commerce affected); Intl. Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S.
392, 396 (1947) (holding that “foreclos[ing] competitors from any substantial market” is per se illegal);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding that resale price
maintenance is illegal); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1020, 1032-33 (differentiating between
allocative efficiency and consumer welfare).
11. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 209 (1987).
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its strictures.12 But then “some economists started kicking the tires on the
Chicago results.”13
What is it? Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize.14 It
“has been a source of puzzlement to lawyers, judges and scholars. . . .”15
Its standards are “not just vague but vacuous.”16 “Notwithstanding a century of litigation, the scope and meaning of exclusionary conduct under the
Sherman Act remain poorly defined.”17 Indeed, “[t]here is great variation
in how the courts analyze unilateral practices.”18 Thus, although scholars19
and courts20 have attempted to describe what Section 2 prohibits, about the
12. See e.g. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Symposium, Antitrust: Designing Antitrust Rules
for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 74, 77 (2005)
(stating that in the 1950s, the Chicago School began arguing that many unilateral practices should be
per se legal and that the Chicago School “revolutionalized antitrust”); Edmund W. Kitch e.d., The Fire
of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J. L. & Econ. 163 (1983)
(overview of Chicago School antitrust literature); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust,
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979); The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law vol. 1, 22733, 601-05 (Peter Newman ed., Stockton Press 1998) (origins of Chicago School).
13. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12 at 78-79. True or not, Kodak has been criticized by the same group
that supposedly obtained the imprimatur. See e.g. Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837 (1990). Evans and Padilla believe that the post-Chicago group
received a “limited Supreme Court imprimatur” in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992), wherein the Court rejected a per se legal approach in favor of a rule of reason
approach. See e.g. Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to
Deal – Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L.J. 659, 678-81 (2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 257, 318-23 (2001)
(recognizing contributions of post-Chicago School of antitrust); Motta, supra n. 10.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
15. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1623; see also Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 47,
48-52 (1982) (whether barrier to entry is desirable depends on whether one believes that the property
right to exclude creating the barrier is desirable).
16. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 255 (2003).
17. Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147, 147-48, 164 n. 4
(2005). According to Hovenkamp, “[t]he first Supreme Court case that treated unilateral exclusionary
conduct on the merits was Stand. Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).”
18. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 73.
19. See generally e.g. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17.
20. Recently, the Supreme Court explained Section 2 thusly:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. . . . To
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.
Verizon Commun., Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (original emphasis omitted). The classic definition of a Section 2 claim occurred in U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570-71 (1966). On another occasion, the Court defined monopolizing conduct as “the use of
monopoly power to ‘foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’” Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 482-83 (quoting U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
Try squaring that definition with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s observation in Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., that “injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous
competition, and the antitrust laws are not balm for rivals’ wounds.” 864 F.2d 1409, 1413 (7th Cir.
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best that can be said is that it prohibits a firm from “do[ing] something
bad.”21 Though “we have made some progress toward a new standard,
there is still a long way to go.”22
The ambiguity of what Section 2 prohibits can have grave consequences. “Few roles of government are more important to the upgrading
of an economy than ensuring vigorous domestic rivalry.”23 In today’s fast
paced marketplace, “[i]t is desirable for [firms] to be able to know what the
law is – what is permitted and what is not.”24 Uncertainty “dulls investment and deters welfare-increasing competition.”25 On the other hand,
“[f]irms will get away with welfare-reducing practices if competition policy is too lenient. . . .”26 Also, to the extent that preventing administrative
difficulties is a legitimate concern of antitrust analysis, Section 2’s ambiguity certainly does not further administrative ease.27 At least one commentator has suggested that plaintiffs have won cases not on the merits, but
“[a]t least in part because of the looseness of existing Section 2 standards.”28 And in a world where competition is global, uncertainty resulting

1989); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984). On yet another
occasion, the Supreme Court indicated that a firm does not engage in monopolizing conduct if the
conduct is a function of “valid business reasons,” a “normal business purpose,” or “legitimate business
reasons.” See e.g. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597, 605, 608
(1985). What is “valid,” “normal,” or “legitimate?” See Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 265. As Kauper has
observed,
[t]he court’s [in LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003)] lengthy analysis of the
major Supreme Court decisions following the decision in Alcoa comes to the unremarkable
conclusion that ‘a monopolist will be found to violate [Section Two] of the Sherman Act if
it engages in exclusionary or predatory conduct without a valid business justification.’
Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1633. The court in Microsoft gave a “fairly elaborate definition [of exclusionary
conduct] that included allocation of proof burdens” that Hovenkamp has described as “fairly unfocused.” Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 152-53. Recognizing the limits of the Supreme Court’s definition
of conduct prohibited by Section 2, Elhauge has observed that “[c]ourts and commentators have offered
other formulations to get around these problems with the Grinnell test.” Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 263.
21. Edlin, supra n. 7, at 950.
22. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1625, 1627. Kauper has further observed that the Supreme Court has not
“particularly distinguished itself in Section Two cases.”
23. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 662 (Free Press 1990).
24. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055; see also Edlin, supra n. 7, at 967 (“One advantage of a bright-line
rule is that it would let incumbents know where they stand.”). In the context of one theory of Section 2
liability, essential facilities, Elhauge has remarked that “the persistence of the essential facilities doctrine in the lower courts demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s more general monopolization standards
have not provided sufficient guidance to make it clear that antitrust duties to deal do not apply to monopolists who develop ‘superior’ products.” Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 262.
25. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 74.
26. Id. at 80.
27. See e.g. AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that
preventing administrative difficulties is a legitimate concern to antitrust analysis).
28. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1624.
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in differences in the application of competition law can result in conduct
being legal in one jurisdiction and illegal in another.29
Scholars30 and the government31 have taken their shots at coming up
with a test for identifying conduct prohibited by Section 2 – all of which
have their problems.32 But then there’s the golden boy – predatory pricing.
29. See Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 264-65 (“The utter vacuity of this sort of standard is neatly illustrated by the fact that the same conduct – using above-cost price cuts to drive out rivals – has been
labeled ‘competition on the merits’ in the United States, but not ‘normal competition’ in Europe.”).
30. See e.g. ABA Sec. on Antitrust, 2002 Annual Rev. of Antitrust L. Devs. 249 (5th ed., ABA 2003)
(conduct is “especially” likely to be predatory if it is “improper for reasons extrinsic to the antitrust
laws.”); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 194-95 (2d ed., U. of Chi. Press 2001) (conduct capable of
excluding an equally efficient rival); Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust
113 (West 1977) (asserting that competitive behavior can be distinguished from anticompetitive behavior because the latter involves “the predator . . . acting in a way which will not maximize present or
foreseeable future profits unless it drives or keeps others out or forces them to tread softly. . . . Such
conduct makes sense if, but only if, it is seen as a means of driving out or controlling competitors.”);
William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory
Pricing, 89 Yale L.J. 1 (1979) (proposing that price used to capture monopoly is market price and
should be frozen there to avoid predatory pricing); Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing,
91 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 59 (2005) (“Examples of desirable predation rules include complete immunity
against predation claims for firms with market shares below particular thresholds, per se legality for
prices above the specified cost threshold, and well-defined safe harbors for mixed bundling schemes.”);
Edlin, supra n. 7 (advocating for a price freeze when faced with new competition, and suggesting a
“quality freeze” too); Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 256 (arguing that “the proper monopolization standard
should focus on whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power (1)
only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or
not it enhances monopolist efficiency”); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986) (only exclusionary conduct that raises rivals’ costs and allows firm to charge supra-competitive prices should be
prohibited); Ari Lehman, Eliminating the Below-Cost Pricing Requirement from Predatory Pricing
Claims, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 343 (2005) (only possibility of recoupment should be considered in predatory pricing cases); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:
Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale L.J. 8 (1981) (sacrifice of profits test); Steven C. Salop & R.
Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 Geo.
Mason L. Rev. 617, 650-51 (1999) (proposing analysis of impacts of conduct on raising barriers to
competition and efficiency effects); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust
Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 551 (1991) (contending that high concentration and
barriers to entry are prerequisites to successful exclusionary conduct). Hovenkamp has opined that a
“workable” definition of exclusionary conduct must satisfy two criteria: 1) it must define prohibited
conduct with “tolerable accuracy, in particular, without excessive false positives” and 2) it must “be
administrable by a court, perhaps in a jury trial.” See Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 148.
31. See Br. for U.S. & FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petr. at 15-25, Verizon, 540 U.S. 398 (conduct that sacrifices profits and conduct the profitability of which depends on excluding rivals).
32. See e.g. Edlin, supra n. 7, at 945-49 (advocating predation test without requiring sacrifice of
short-run profits); Elhauge, supra n. 16 (criticizing sacrifice test, efficiency-based tests, and balancing);
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance,
72 Antitrust L.J. 3, 56-57 (2004) (criticizing sacrifice theory of predation); see Hovenkamp, supra n.
17, at 154, 157, 160 (excluding equally efficient rival “can underdeter in situations where the rival that
is most likely to emerge is less efficient than the dominant firm”) (“‘Sacrifice’ of short-run revenues is
a necessary, but hardly a sufficient, condition for condemning a unilateral refusal to deal under [section] 2.”) (“In sum, raising rivals’ costs is a sometimes useful but also incomplete definition of exclusionary practices.”). Regarding Edlin’s price and quality freezes, one should consider very seriously
the Seventh Circuit’s admonition that “the antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man
regulatory agencies.” Chi. Prof. Sports LP v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996).
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“We may have a lot of uncertainty around the edges [of the predatory pricing doctrine], including what precise measure of costs to use. But we can
spot the bald man and the above-cost pricer without difficulty in most
cases. . . .”33 The test for measuring predatory pricing is certain,34 business
knows where it stands,35 it fosters vigorous price competition rather than
stifling it,36 and it avoids costly erroneous decisions.37 Indeed, many start
with the predatory pricing standard and try to extrapolate from it a standard
that could apply more generally under Section 2.38
In this article, I take the opposite approach. Rather than trying to “spot
the bald man” through a rule-based economic analysis, as occurs in predatory pricing cases, we should take a page from Justice Holmes, who wrote:
“General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major
33. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 268.
34. See e.g. id. at 268 (“[T]he one exception to the current vacuity of monopolization standards may
be the most maligned area of monopolization law – predatory pricing doctrine. You may love it or you
may hate it, but at least you have some idea what the doctrine means.”); Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at
148 (“About the best antitrust has been able to produce are rules designed for specific classes of cases,
such as the cost rules governing predatory pricing. . . .”).
35. See e.g. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1635 (“It is undoubtedly true that businesses would be comforted
by a bright line, below cost standard. . . .”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court
adopted the general rule that above-cost price cuts never violate the antitrust laws, it made the law of
predatory pricing more predictable than it had previously been.”).
36. See e.g. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226-27
(1993) (“It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low that
antitrust suits themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.”); John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory
Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? (U. of Chi. Press 1999) (often, what competitors claim is predation is often just ordinary competition); Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 73 (“[T]here
is no reason to assume that aggressive unilateral pricing is bad – quite the opposite.”); Hovenkamp,
supra n. 17, at 157 (“We do not condemn the monopolist who cuts price to an above cost level because
it knew that a rival would be forced to exit from the market. Such behavior is completely consistent
with our conception of proper competition.”); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard
Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1080 (“It is appropriate that the
courts and the government tread cautiously in limiting a firm’s freedom to cut prices.”); but see Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. Polit. Econ. 266
(1986) (cost to a firm of acquiring competitors reduced through predation).
37. See e.g. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a
particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition.”);
Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 83 (“There is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions of the
Supreme Court. A practice once condemned is likely to stay condemned, no matter its benefits. A
monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually yield to competition, though, as the monopolist’s higher prices attract rivalry.”) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1984)); Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 657, 701-02
(2001) (Competition will constrain false acquittal costs, “[a] dominant firm that consistently charges
monopoly prices will attract entrants to its market.”); see also Joskow & Klevorick, supra n. 7, at 223
(“[A]ny [predatory pricing] standard that encourages entry by forcing price to be kept above long-run
marginal cost for a period of time necessarily runs the risk of preserving inefficient firms. . . .”).
38. See Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 269 (“The relative success with predatory pricing doctrine has led
courts and commentators to try to generalize it into a global standard for determining what conduct
meets the exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization test.”).
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premise.”39 If predatory pricing is as good as it gets, and it still fails to
capture conduct with anticompetitive consequences, then we should abandon all strict rules-based approaches to Section 2 cases in favor of a factbased Rule of Reason analysis.40 After all, as Justice Holmes recognized,
“a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”41
In Part II of the article, I generally describe predatory pricing law –
where we’ve been and where we are. In Part III of the article, I try to take
some of the luster off of the golden boy and point out deficiencies in the
current predatory pricing standard. In Part IV of the article, I advocate for
adopting the Rule of Reason as the standard in Section 2 cases.
II. PREDATORY PRICING – FROM HAIRY HIPPY TO BALD MAN
It has been argued that the antitrust laws’ legislative history supports
the notion that the laws were meant to prohibit anticompetitive price cuts –
regardless of whether they are below cost.42 Thus, predatory pricing
claims used to turn simply on whether the allegedly predatory price was
intended to harm rivals.43 In fact, liability for predatory price discrimina-

39. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. The classic articulation of the Rule of Reason occurred in Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. U.S.,
246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918) (setting forth:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business . . . ; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
); see also State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 22 (1997); Natl. Socy. of Prof. Engrs. v. U.S., 435
U.S. 679 (1978); Stand. Oil, 221 U.S. 1; William C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook 466 (1995 ed.,
Clark Boardman Callaghan 1995); James A. Keyte, What It Is and How It Is Being Applied: The
“Quick Look” Rule of Reason, 11 Antitrust 21 (1997) (explaining the quick look rule and analyzing its
applications); Sullivan, supra n. 30, at 187-88.
41. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
42. See e.g. Shores, supra n. 9; see also H.R. Rpt. 74-2287, at 7-8 (1936) (reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes vol. 4, 3187 (Earl W. Kintner ed.,
Chelsea H. Publishers 1980)); Sen. Rpt. 74-1502 at 4 (Feb. 3, 1936) (reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes vol. 4, 3014-15 (Earl W. Kintner ed., Chelsea
H. Publishers 1980)); Sen. Rpt. 63-698 at 1 (1914) (reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal
Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes vol. 2, 1744 (Earl W. Kintner ed., Chelsea H. Publishers 1978));
H.R. Rpt. 63-627 at 8-9 (July 22, 1914) (reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust
Laws and Related Statutes vol. 2, 1090-91 (Earl W. Kintner ed., Chelsea H. Publishers 1978)).
43. See e.g. Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
335 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1964); Md. Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Muller
& Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944). Elhauge has offered that this standard “helped not a
whit in sorting out bad pricing from good.” Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 269.
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tion was found without requiring probable or actual monopolization.44 Yet
some cases brought early under Section 2 suggest that below cost pricing
was indicative of, if not proof of, the type of conduct Section 2 prohibits.45
The results under this old scheme were mixed.46
Then came Areeda and Turner’s “watershed article”47 – Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.48 They
proposed using cost analysis to evaluate pricing behavior to identify and
distinguish predatory pricing from competitive pricing.49 Criticism of
Areeda and Turner’s theory came early, and primarily focused on the difficulty in measuring cost.50 More recent scholarship also points to the difficulty of measuring cost, but goes further by arguing that a strict, cost-based
analysis does not adequately capture prices that may be predatory even
though above cost.51
Then came the Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.52 In it, the Supreme Court directed federal
courts to play a gatekeeping role to ensure that only economically sound

44. See e.g. Utah Pie Co. v. Contl. Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). Edlin has called such cases
“particularly galling.” Edlin, supra n. 7, at 953.
45. See e.g. U.S. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160 (1911) (observing that American Tobacco
was engaging in “ruinous competition, by lowering the price of plug below its cost”).
46. See e.g. Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo.
L.J. 2239, 2250 (2000) (asserting that before 1975, “[p]laintiffs won most litigated cases, including
those they probably should have lost”).
47. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1087.
48. 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
49. See id.
50. See e.g. Sullivan, supra n. 30, at 110-11. Areeda and Turner even went back and forth with one
of their immediate critics, F.M. Scherer, exchanging volleys on the cost-based approach. Compare
F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 868 (1976)
(specifically his section entitled Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, at 883-85), with
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 891
(1976), with F.M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (1976).
Oliver Williamson agreed with Areeda and Turner that marginal cost pricing had certain benefits to
which Areeda and Turner referred, but was concerned that their proposed legal rule would immunize
short-term price cuts that would lead to supra-competitive prices later. See Oliver E. Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284, 290 (1977).
51. See e.g. Robert Pitofsky et al., Trade Regulation 868-69 (5th ed., West 2003); Richard A. Posner, supra n. 30, at 217-20 (suggesting that Areeda and Turner’s test is too generous to defendants);
Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 Antitrust L.J.
585, 591 (1994) (price cuts that don’t fall below cost may still injure competition); Patrick Bolton et al.,
Predatory Pricing: Response to Critique and Further Elaboration, 89 Geo. L.J. 2495, 2499 (2001)
(advocating the use of factual evidence in addition to economic theory); Bolton et al., supra n. 46, at
2242-62 (discussing criticism of Areeda and Turner and suggesting alternatives); Edlin, supra n. 7, at
942 (“above-cost pricing can . . . hurt consumers by limiting competition”); see also Crane, supra n. 30,
at 3 (recognizing that “some commentators and courts have wondered whether the Supreme Court has
become too solicitous of price competition and too skeptical about claims of predation”).
52. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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cases go to a jury.53 Courts applying Matsushita have interpreted it as creating “a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that predatory pricing
is unlikely to threaten competition.”54
With Matsushita as a backdrop, and despite the criticism of Areeda
and Turner’s cost-based approach, the Supreme Court formally adopted a
cost-based approach to evaluating predatory pricing claims in Brooke
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.55 Specifically, the Court explained that a successful predatory pricing claim requires proof that 1) the
price is below an appropriate measure of cost, and 2) “the competitor had a
reasonable prospect, or, under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous
probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”56 In laymen’s terms, “[i]f you price below your incremental costs and have enough
market power to make it reasonably likely than you can recoup your losses
by raising prices after you have disciplined or driven out your rival, then
you have engaged in predatory pricing. If you price above cost, you are
home free.”57
Brooke Group has been viewed as a dramatic break with precedent.58
Whereas Brooke Group creates a safe harbor59 for price cuts so long as
they are above some measure of cost, the Supreme Court’s previous cases
on predation had required only a showing of an intent to harm competition.60 Nonetheless, Brooke Group – concededly revolutionary – had roots
53. See id. at 587-88; see also Crane, supra n. 30, at 47 (“Matsushita invites district courts in the
first instance, and courts of appeal in the second, to scrutinize the economic logic of predatory pricing
cases and only permit theoretically sound cases to proceed to the jury.”). Crane sees in Matsushita a
“counterweight to anticorporate jury tendencies in the form of heightened judicial scrutiny of plaintiffs’
predatory pricing claims.” Id.; see also James L. Warren & Mary B. Cranston, Summary Judgment
After Matsushita, Antitrust 12-13 (Summer 1987) (describing Matsushita’s stringent gatekeeping
standards).
54. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newsps., Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted); see
also Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating
that the Court in Matsushita decided “that the economic disincentives to predatory pricing often will
justify a presumption that an allegation of such behavior is implausible”). As Wesley J. Liebeler has
noted, “almost all of the predatory pricing cases that have come before the courts since 1975 could
have been decided summarily for the defendant under the standards set forth in Matsushita.” Wesley J.
Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1052, 1054 (1986).
55. 509 U.S. at 222-24.
56. Id.
57. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 268; see also Edlin, supra n. 7, at 950-55 (laying out current state of
predation law).
58. See e.g. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1086.
59. See Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1628 (“Brooke Group comes close to establishing a safe harbor for
predatory pricing cases, a safe harbor based on a combination of below-cost sales and the use of market
share or capacity data to establish the reasonable likelihood of recoupment or its absence.”); Lehman,
supra n. 30, at 372.
60. See e.g. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221 (discussing previous predation jurisprudence). In fact,
shortly before Brooke Group, the Court specifically declined to decide whether a party could show
predatory pricing when the pricing in question is above some measure of cost. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
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in previous cases.61 Notwithstanding the evolution of predatory pricing
towards a comparably clear rule based approach, it “is currently generating
considerable debate in academic literature.”62 The debate extends to what
constitutes predatory pricing63 – commentators still are not sure what it is.64
Further, predatory pricing has variations across the globe.65
III. DULLING THE GOLDEN BOY
Predatory pricing law has lost its focus. Rather than focusing on the
forest – the competitive consequences of conduct – courts are preoccupied
with a single tree – whether the Brooke Group test has been met regardless
of actual competitive consequences. This is a function of a preoccupation
with economic theory rather than cold, hard facts. It is also a function of a
preoccupation with classifying conduct rather than evaluating the results of
conduct as demonstrated by facts. These general propositions manifest
themselves in the problems specific to Brooke Group – it does not result in
certainty, foster price competition, or benefit consumers.

585 n. 9; Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 702. Elhauge has suggested that it did not even do so in Brooke Group
to the extent that its statement that the Court has “rejected . . . the notion that above-cost prices . . .
inflict injury to competition cognizable under the antitrust laws” is dicta. See Einer Elhauge, Why
Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory – and the Implications for Defining
Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L.J. 681, 697 (2003) (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223).
61. See e.g. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (7th Cir.
1989); Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d 227. Barry Wright has been described as an “influential preBrooke Group case in which the court held that predatory pricing suits could not be brought when
prices exceed all measures of cost.” Edlin, supra n. 7, at 987.
62. Lehman, supra n. 30, at 343; see generally Bolton et al., supra n. 46; David Close, “Don’t Fear
the Reaper”: Why Transferable Assets and Avoidable Costs Should Not Resurrect Predatory Pricing,
88 Iowa L. Rev. 433 (2002); Edlin, supra n. 7; Elhauge, supra n. 60; Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a
Behaviorally Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, 18 Antitrust 52
(2003).
63. Compare Baumol, supra n. 30, at 2-3 (above cost pricing can be predatory); Edlin, supra n. 7, at
945-46 (same); Williamson, supra n. 50, at 290-92 (same), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 269-304; 333-37 (1981) (above cost pricing
can not be predatory); Elhauge, supra note 30 (above cost pricing can not be predatory).
64. Compare Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 27 (2005) (equating bundling with predatory pricing), with Richard A. Posner, Vertical
Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 229 (2005) (multi-product ties create unique antitrust concerns); Ordover & Willig, supra n. 30, at 55 (collecting critiques).
65. See e.g. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 264 (European Commission approach to predatory pricing);
Norman W. Hawker, Predatory Pricing Law in the United States and Canada, 7 U. Miami Bus. L.
Rev. 201 (1999) (Canadian approach to predatory pricing law); Ross Jones, An International Perspective on Anti-Competitive Pricing Practices by Dominant Carriers & Regulatory Rules to Facilitate
Competitive Entry – Australia, 14 DePaul Bus. L.J. 243, 249-50 (2002) (Australian approach to predatory pricing law).
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A. The First Swipe – Economic Theory
Rules based on economic theory are great – if you price below cost,
you may be pricing predatorily, if you don’t, you’re not – but such rules
have the same limitations as all rules. “[T]he trick is to carry general principle as far as it can go in substantial furtherance of the precise statutory or
constitutional prescription.”66 Wedding predatory pricing analysis to a
cost-based standard is not necessarily commensurate with the legislative
history of the antitrust laws.67 Further, economic theory does not bear any
relationship to reality in all cases.68 For example, though the Supreme
Court in Brooke Group declared that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely
tried, and even more rarely successful,”69 predatory pricing claims continue
to be filed70 and recent scholarship suggests that predation occurs far more
often than previously believed.71 When economic theory does bear a rela66. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989); see
also Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 57
(2003) (survey of legal formalism).
67. See generally supra n. 42; Shores, supra n. 9, at 1091 (“In short, Brooke Group stands for the
proposition that economic theory trumps legislative history. . . .”).
68. See e.g. R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 3-4 (U. Chi. Press 1988).
The rational utility maximizer of economic theory bears no resemblance to the man on the
Clapham bus or, indeed, to any man (or woman) on any bus. There is no reason to suppose
that most human beings are engaged in maximizing anything unless it be unhappiness, and
even this with incomplete success.
Id.
69. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (citation omitted); see also Bork, supra n. 7, at 144 (arguing that
“[u]nsophisticated theories of predation . . . [have led] to drastic overestimation of its likelihood”);
Easterbrook, supra n. 63, at 264 (“[T]here is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the courts to take
predation seriously.”).
70. See e.g. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121 (recognizing that there is ample evidence that predatory pricing
occurs); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); Multistate Leg. Stud.,
Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof. Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995);
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722 (W.D. Tx. 2003) (jury
verdict at trial, settled while on appeal); Crane, supra n. 30, at n. 18 (listing predatory pricing cases).
Some, all, or none of such cases may have been filed for strategic reason. See Edward A. Snyder &
Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 551
(1991) (study showing that competitor plaintiffs systematically misuse the antitrust laws). But there is
no way to be certain. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 36 (data is consistent with firms using predatory pricing cases strategically, “but direct proof is limited.”). Given the cost of the strategy, it may be unlikely.
See Easterbrook, supra n. 63, at 334-35 (estimating mean litigation cost in predatory pricing case at $3
million, and explaining that AT&T spent $100 million to defend against predation charges); Steven C.
Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1001, 1015
(1986) ($75,000 to $194,000 in 1984 dollars).
71. See e.g. Pitofsky et al., supra n. 51, at 869; Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization
361-80 (MIT 1988) (limit pricing and predation can preclude entry); Bolton et al., supra n. 46, at 225051 (pricing below cost can send “strategic communication involving threats and sanctions”); Evans &
Padilla, supra n. 12, at 78 (“A further strand of modern economics undercuts the proposition that firms
had no incentive or ability to engage in predatory pricing.”); Yun Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of
Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store
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tionship to reality, it can be in conflict with itself.72 Economic theory has
also limited the reach of antitrust to such an extent that important areas of
the law have remained unchanged, unchallenged, and (arguably) underenforced for more than thirty years.73
In the antitrust context, “general principles based on economic theory
that tell us nothing about the actual economic effect of a particular restraint
in a particular case should be . . . cast aside.”74 This principle – that facts
demonstrating economic effect trump theory – has been recognized by
courts in predatory pricing cases.75 Far more frequently, plaintiffs lose if

Game, 25 RAND J. Econ. 72, 73 (1994) (experiment supports theory that firms engage in predation to
support reputation of strength); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of
Predatory Pricing, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 162, 163 (1993) (an incumbent may be able to
use predation to build a reputation for toughness and thus discourage potential new entrants); David M.
Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. Econ. Theory 253 (1982) (analyzing effect on reputation of predatory pricing); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry
Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 Econometrica 443 (1982); Paul Milgrom
& John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. Econ. Theory 280 (1982) (predation may be rational against new entrants because it yields a reputation that deters entrants); Ordover &
Willig, supra n. 30, at 77-79 (in more complex, realistic markets, aggressive pricing can yield long-run
benefits).
72. See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text In This Class?” The Conflict
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 38, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=556380 (last
updated Apr. 23, 2006).
So, Brown & Williamson, an experienced and successful company with many decades of intimate knowledge of this industry, apparently believed that it could better its profits by forcing Liggett back into line through a price war, but Justice Kennedy and his colleagues,
armed with the best economic theory Chicago has to offer, know better – Brown & Williamson was just wasting its shareholders’ money. How arrogant. How implausible. Note
that in accepting a highly contestable and specific economic theory, the Court ignores a
much more general and basic piece of wisdom from economics: we should generally presume that experienced actors within an industry are rationally pursuing their goals.
Id.
73. Eleanor M. Fox et al., U.S. Antitrust in Global Context 300, 302 (2d ed., West 2004) (“General
Dynamics is still the latest horizontal merger case decided on its merits by the Supreme Court, and it
remains good law. . . . Marine Bancorporation is the Supreme Court’s last word on mergers that eliminate potential competition.”). Both cases are more than thirty years old. U.S. v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); U.S. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
74. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1054.
75. See e.g. Contl. T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 946
(stating that in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff can prove predatory
pricing based on factors other than the relation between an alleged predator’s price and cost); Concord
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, a plaintiff can prove predatory pricing based on factors other than the
relation between an alleged predator’s price and cost); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Contl.
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
a plaintiff can prove predatory pricing based on factors other than the relation between an alleged
predator’s price and cost). According to Shores, the Supreme Court’s precedent before Brooke Group
had been generally understood as holding that while below-cost pricing was powerful evidence of
predatory intent, it was not critical to the plaintiff’s case.” Shores, supra n. 9, at 1085-86.
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they cannot show below cost pricing.76 This is so notwithstanding the fact
that economics does not necessarily help decision-makers reach the right
conclusions.77 Indeed, it may confuse the issues to the point where it hurts
more than helps.78
B. The Second Swipe – Missing the Forest for the Trees
There seems to be a preoccupation with classifying specific types of
conduct and trying to define standards based on conduct’s classification,
rather than focusing on standards for evaluating the results of conduct regardless of how the conduct is classified.79 Such a preoccupation can result in overly formalistic application of rules that may excuse conduct that
76. The Sixth Circuit in Spirit Airlines had to reverse the district court’s award of summary judgment to Northwest Airlines since the district court had found that “the record compels the conclusion
that Northwest’s prices were not predatory, because the airline operated profitably” on the relevant
routes. See Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 227; MCI Commun. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983) (pricing above long run incremental costs not predatory); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. N.W. Airlines,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26831 at *77 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also Debra J. Pearlstein et al. eds.,
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 474, 476 (5th ed. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s observation in Brooke Group that predatory pricing claims are ‘rarely successful’ has proved to
be prescient. In the years since that decision, primary line injury claims frequently have been defeated
on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.”); Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 156 (predatory pricing
“law requires that prices be below cost.”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1080 (in predatory pricing cases, “the
government never wins. And, of course, private plaintiffs have fared no better.”).
77. See Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 80 (“We are less confident in the ability of economics to
help juries, courts, and regulators to reason their way to the right answers.”). Elhauge has noted that
“scholars have so far also been unable to devise administrable standards for sorting out desirable from
undesirable conduct that tends to exclude rivals.” Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 267; see Elhauge, supra n.
16, at n. 43 (Prominent antitrust economists William Baumol, Janus Ordover, Frederick WarrenBoulton, and Robert Willig, acknowledge that courts and legal and economic scholars have “not yet
been able to solve the ‘vexing problem’ of developing ‘workable standards’ for determining when
conduct. . . . [is] exclusionary, so that there is not yet any ‘universal economic litmus test’ for judging
this question.”).
78. See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73
Denv. U. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1995) (juror interviews in antitrust trials, including Brooke Group, revealed
that “the jurors were overwhelmed, frustrated, and confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension. . . . At no time did any juror grasp – even at the margins – the law, the economics, or any
other testimony relating to the allegations or defense.”); Crane, supra n. 30, at 46 (“It would surely be
surprising to find that jurors actually understand the substance of predatory pricing law, when the very
definition of predation and its elements have long been, and continue to be, debated by the brightest
minds in both economics and law.”); Edlin, supra n. 7, at 956 (“My view is that one reason that two
decades of information-theoretical results in economics have not had as much influence on the courts as
they should is that they are relatively complex.”).
79. See e.g. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 342 (lamenting the use of “a barrage of conclusory labels like
‘exclusionary,’ ‘predatory,’ ‘valid,’ ‘legitimate,’ and ‘competition on the merits’ to cover for a lack of
any well-defined criteria for sorting out desirable from undesirable conduct that tends to exclude rivals”); Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1626 (“Much of the effort in the past has been directed toward tailoring
standards more precisely to particular conduct. The leveraging doctrine, the concept of essential facilities, and the relatively specific rule governing predatory pricing are products of this effort.”); but see
Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1640 (“The Court has moved away from standards tailored to particular conduct.”).
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has anticompetitive consequences.80 Further, classification “is not always
very helpful in evaluating novel practices.”81 Whole volumes are written
trying to classify conduct that may violate the antitrust laws.82 Despite the
efforts at classification, clarity remains elusive.83
80. See e.g. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343 (“[T]he result of the process in any given case may provide
little certainty or guidance about the legality of a practice in another context.”); City of Anaheim v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t would not be proper to focus on specific
individual acts of an accused monopolist while refusing to consider their overall combined effect. . . .
We are dealing with what has been called the ‘synergistic effect’ of the mixture of the elements.”). The
Supreme Court has recognized as much in the area of vertical non-price restraints. Compare Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (drawing a distinction between sale and consignment of goods as they
relate to legality of vertical non-price restraints), with Contl. T.V., 433 U.S. 36 (overruling Schwinn and
recognizing distinction between sale and consignment as false for purposes of antitrust law). In U.S. v.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), American Airlines won summary judgment on a predatory
pricing claim because the trial court found that it was pricing above variable costs despite evidence that
it drove competitors from the market and, thereafter, raised prices – in Lehman’s words, “exactly the
harm economists worry about with anticompetitive behavior.” Lehman, supra n. 30, at 355; see also
Edlin, supra n. 7, at 943 (criticizing AMR decision). Shores thus concludes that “[t]he distinction between sales and consignments was formalistic because it failed to address the core issue in every antitrust case: Does the challenged restraint adversely affect competition in the market?” Shores, supra n.
9, at 1054. Hovenkamp, praising theories based on raising rivals’ costs, explained that the benefits of
such theories are that they “show that certain practices that have been the subject of antitrust scrutiny
for a long time can be anticompetitive even though they do not literally ‘exclude.’” Hovenkamp, supra
n. 17, at 159. In other words, just because conduct cannot be shoehorned into a definition of “exclusionary” conduct does not mean that it is not anticompetitive. And what is more important under the
antitrust laws, whether conduct can fit into an arbitrary definition or its results – competitive or anticompetitive? Edlin has opined that “a single rule – the Brooke Group rule – does not fit all cases well.”
Edlin, supra n. 7, at 960-61 (examples). Elhauge has recognized the “sad state in which current monopolization doctrine finds itself, employing conclusory labels that offer little insight into which forms
of conduct should and should not be deemed undesirable or illegal.” Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 255.
81. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 150. One example may be the conduct at issue in Conwood Co.,
290 F.3d 768 (tobacco manufacturer discarded competitor’s point of sale displays and put competitor’s
product in disadvantage positions in own displays). It is a much maligned decision. See e.g. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at n. 20; Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
Antitrust Principles and Their Application vol. 3A, ¶ 782, 206 (Aspen Supp. 2004) [hereinafter Areeda
& Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3A] (“In Conwood the Sixth Circuit brushed aside most of the accepted principles developed in the case law and the main text for distinguishing antitrust violations
from tortious and even competitive practices.”). Although criticism may not be unwarranted, one
should consider that “accepted principles” should be applied given the nuances in particular markets,
which is what the court did in Conwood. For example, there was evidence in the record – indeed, the
parties agreed – regarding the importance of point of sale advertising to the tobacco industry. See e.g.
Conwood, 290 F.3d at 774. Thus, although destroying point of sale displays in other industries may not
be a big deal, in tobacco it may very well be. Given that, a systemic plan to destroy point of sale displays in the tobacco industry (coupled with the other conduct described in Conwood) may be worthy of
a jury question on monopolization.
82. See e.g. Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3, supra n. 81 (referencing, for example: ch.
7A “Horizontal Acquisitions and Agreements”; ch. 7B “Exclusionary Practices: Patents”; and ch. 7C
“Exploitative, Predatory, and Strategic Pricing”); id. (referencing, for example: ch. 7D “Exclusionary
Practices by Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms”; ch. 7E “Unfair, Predatory, and Tortious Competition Unrelated to Pricing Policies”, ch. 7F “Exclusionary Practices by the Regulated Monopolist”; and
ch. 8 “Power and the Power-Conduct Relationship in Monopolization and Attempt”).
83. Hovenkamp has argued, for example, that Areeda and Turner have given different definitions of
exclusionary conduct over the evolution of their treatise on antitrust. See Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at
149.
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In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., for example, the
Supreme Court conceded that “contrary inferences might reasonably be
drawn” about whether the conduct at issue could “fairly be characterized as
exclusionary. . . .”84 Thus, if it “is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects,”85 courts
and regulators should focus their attention not on whether certain conduct
meets some definition,86 but on the conduct’s competitive effects.87
C. The Brooke Group Fallacy
Over reliance on economics and a preoccupation with classification
manifests itself in the problems with Brooke Group – problems that contradict and, in many respects, swallow its benefits. Since the Court in
Brooke Group left open the question of the relevant measure of costs,88 it
provides no certainty on what may constitute predatory pricing.89 Some
courts adopted average variable cost as the relevant measure, others average total cost.90 Areeda and Turner themselves recognized the challenges
84. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 604.
85. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993).
86. Conwood, 290 F.3d at 784 (“‘[A]nticompetitive’ conduct can come in too many different forms,
and is too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have enumerated all the varieties.”).
87. Pitofsky has criticized the notion that above-cost price cuts cannot produce competitive harm as
“simplistic and overly generous to predators and would-be monopolists.” Pitofsky et al., supra n. 51, at
868.
88. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 n. 1.
89. See e.g. Rebel Oil Co. v. A. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
“[n]either the Supreme Court nor this circuit has concluded what would be the appropriate measure of
cost in a predatory pricing case.”); Crane, supra n. 30, at 43 (stating:
Predatory pricing litigation is an unpredictable enterprise. The legal standards governing
predation claims require examination of complex economic facts, such as whether costs exceeded revenues and whether defendant would have been able to recoup the costs of belowcost pricing. Even tests meant to provide clear guidance on permissible and impermissible
pricing behavior leave open significant space for adjudicatory ambiguity.
); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1087 (“Thus, while the court was clear in adopting a cost-based standard, it
failed to define that standard.”).
90. See Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62
Antitrust L.J. 541, 548-49 (1994); Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice § 8.5a (3d ed., West 2005) (representative cases); Penelope A. Preovolos, Unfair
Practices and Predatory Pricing, 1408 PLI/Corp 687 passim (2004) (listing the First Circuit as “incremental or variable”; the Second Circuit as “average variable cost/presumptions”; the Fifth Circuit as
average variable or marginal costs; the Sixth Circuit as a hybrid; the Seventh Circuit as a “pure recoupment”; the Eighth Circuit as “average variable cost/presumptions”; the Ninth Circuit as average
variable cost/presumptions; the Tenth Circuit as using marginal or average variable costs as a “valuable
indicator”; the Eleventh Circuit as average total cost; and the D.C. Circuit, Third Circuit and Fourth
Circuit as declining to adopt any measure of cost). Just recently, the Tenth Circuit observed that
“[d]espite a great deal of debate on the subject, no consensus has emerged as to what the most ‘appropriate’ measure of cost is in predatory pricing cases.” AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115. Relatedly, it is
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to relying on marginal cost.91 Thus, the “only certainty after Brooke Group
is that for the plaintiff to prevail on a predatory pricing claim, it must prove
that the defendant priced below whatever cost standard the court deciding
the case has adopted.”92 Importantly, there is no reason to believe that the
Supreme Court will step in and clear up this uncertainty.93 As a result, the
issues of what is the appropriate measure of costs, and how to measure
such costs, are frequently issues of fact that seriously undermine any claim
to certainty.94
Uncertainty regarding the appropriate measure of cost by which predatory pricing claims are evaluated is compounded by the fact that business
schools teach little, if any, antitrust principles.95 Thus, there is little reason
to believe that managers consider principles of predatory pricing law when
making business decisions.96 Further, the whole notion of linking price to
some measure of cost, and punishing those that price below the ordained
measure of costs, has been described as “chimerical” in real markets because “pricing at marginal cost will not produce revenues equal to total
production costs.”97
The uncertainty surrounding the appropriate measure of costs may deter price competition.98 To the extent that Brooke Group’s cost standard is
uncertain whether the “meeting competition” defense is operable in a predatory pricing case. See U.S.
v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1204-08 (D. Kan. 2001).
91. Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3, supra n. 82, at ¶ 740, at 423.
92. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1087.
93. See Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1628 (Brooke Group’s failure to define appropriate measure of cost
“reflects a conscious effort to avoid a difficult issue that divided lower courts.”); see also Cargill, 479
U.S. at 117-18; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85 n. 8.
94. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 651 F.2d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 1981)
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant priced below average variable cost where plaintiff failed
to present expert testimony on the issue); Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d 917; McGahee v. N. Propane Gas
Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504 n. 38 (11th Cir. 1988) (“When average variable cost is appropriate to use, as
well as determining what costs are variable, is an issue of fact requiring expert testimony.”).
95. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 49; Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics and Antitrust in MBA Programs: What’s Thought, What’s Taught, 47 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 87, 92 (2003) (describing the antitrustrelated curricula of certain business schools).
96. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 50-54 (discussing survey results of in-house lawyers regarding predatory pricing law’s impact on business decisions).
97. Baumol, supra n. 30, at 21.
98. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 27 (discussing airline and tobacco industries and concluding that “it is
quite possible that predatory pricing law facilitated the high prices that it is meant to deter”); Lehman,
supra n. 30, at 372 (stating:
In light of the uncertainty surrounding the measure of cost used for antitrust purposes, the
best way for a firm to avoid antitrust trouble is to avoid price competition that comes anywhere close to cost levels. By creating a safe harbor for prices above a certain measure of
cost, the Court is encouraging competitors to avoid vigorous price competition, the opposite
of what it intended.
); see generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 243-44 (5th ed., Aspen Law & Bus.
1998) (“[A] savage penalty will induce people to forgo socially desirable activities at the borderline of
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certain, it serves as an excuse for courts to set firms’ prices – if a firm is
pricing predatorily under Brooke Group, all the court has to do is order that
the firm set its prices above cost.99 The assertion that courts must err on
the side of the market because decisions are so hard to overturn is not
compelling,100 and concerns that a rule other than Brooke Group would
chill price competition have been posited but not proven.101 Additionally,
Brooke Group imposes an undue and unnecessary burden on defendants
because plaintiffs need not prove recoupment – “[p]redators can face treble
damages suits for pricing too low, even if they never offend the law’s ultimate concern by pricing too high.”102 And despite many years of favorable
law, “defendants continue to pay out substantial sums to settle predatory
pricing lawsuits,” thus undermining Brooke Group’s efficacy at deterring
unwarranted predatory pricing claims.103
Lastly, Brooke Group’s rules excuse conduct that may have anticompetitive consequences. For example, a firm may lower its prices in response to a new entrant and drive the entrant from the market. Thereafter,
the firm may raise its prices without having to face competition from the
vanquished new entrant. Consumers are thus denied the benefit of competition on the merits.104 Further, such a result may deter entrants in the first
place.105 The bottom-line is that above-cost predatory pricing may occur, it
may harm competition, and it should not be excused simply because it does
not meet the Brooke Group test so long as it results in anticompetitive consequences.106
the criminal activity.”); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 (1984) (uncertainty leads to overcompliance).
99. See e.g. Am. Bldg. Prods., L.L.C. v. Ashley Aluminum, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15612 (E.D.
La. 1997) (ordering defendant to return its prices to pre-predation levels pending final adjudication of
case); Advantage Publications, Inc. v. Daily Press, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16912 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(ordering defendant to hold its advertising rates at specified levels pending final adjudication of case);
Crane, supra n. 30, at 44 (“[D]etermining which costs are fixed or variable in a particular case requires
complex expert testimony.”).
100. GTE Sylvania overruled Schwinn. Some cases addressed the nearly century-old per se rule
against vertical price fixing. St. Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
101. See e.g. Crane, supra n. 30, at 4 (“[T]he ‘chilling price competition’ claim was posited but never
established.”).
102. According to Crane, this is a function of the fact that attempted predation is captured by the
Sherman Act. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 16, 29.
104. See e.g. Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d 917; see generally AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109; supra n. 80 and
accompanying text; see also Edlin, supra n. 7, at 944, 966.
105. See Edlin, supra n. 7, at 945.
106. See e.g. Pitofsky et al., supra n. 51, at 868; Crane, supra n. 30, at 9 (“If the prey is less efficient
than the predator, the predator may be able to exclude the prey from the market by pricing above its
own cost but below the prey’s.”); Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 338 (“In short, the absence of evidence that
monopoly prices, profits, or shares eventually rose in the long run does not mean the exclusionary
conduct was not anticompetitive.”); Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 156 (“Even above-cost predatory
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IV. THE RULE SHOULD BE REASON IN SECTION 2 CASES
“[A]bstract principles never provide an infallible guide to economic effect.”107 As described above, this has proved true in the most prominent
area of antitrust law that has relied heavily on abstract principles to guide
economic effect – predatory pricing.108 To the extent that rules fail in the
predatory pricing context, they should be abandoned not only in that context, but in all Section 2 cases that involve much more amorphous standards and conduct.109

pricing strategies are unprofitable in the short run, and a rational firm will make such an investment
only if it anticipates that it will be profitable in the long run.”). The Supreme Court has said that
“above-cost predatory pricing schemes [are] beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control.” Verizon, 540 U.S. at 414; see also Joskow & Klevorick, supra n. 7, at 255 (“[N]o practical way
exists to distinguish a predatory price cut to a point above average total cost from one that is a short-run
profit-maximizing response to the growth of competition.”). Implicit in this observation is that abovecost predatory pricing occurs, but is beyond the ability of courts to distinguish from beneficial price
competition. As suggested infra, a Rule of Reason approach addresses the Court’s concern by focusing
on facts rather than bright-line rules that may or may not prove administrable. Others have asserted
that above-cost pricing should not fall under the Sherman Act. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223
(“We have rejected . . . the notion that above-cost prices . . . inflict injury to competition cognizable
under the antitrust laws.”); Posner, supra n. 30, at 215 (arguing that above-cost pricing should not be
unlawful because it cannot exclude an equally efficient competitor); Easterbrook, supra n. 53; Edlin,
supra n. 7, at n. 6 (“The proposition [that above-cost pricing can harm competition] is quite radical in
that even economists who believe that predatory pricing is relatively common have generally been
content to follow the courts in thinking that the key element of predation is short-run sacrifice by the
predator. . . .”); Elhauge, supra n. 60; Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 156 (“If there is no sacrifice of
immediate profits – that is, if the price cut is profitable immediately – then the price is efficient and
absolutely lawful.”); Ordover & Willig, supra n. 30, at 54; Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055 (“For example,
when the Supreme Court adopted the general rule that above-cost price cuts never violate the antitrust
laws, it made the law of predatory pricing more predictable than it had previously been. In doing so,
the Court clarified that a reduction in price cannot be challenged on antitrust grounds, provided it does
not go below cost.”) In some instances, this may be a function of a belief that there is no realistic
alternative. See e.g. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 314-15 (“Until antitrust tribunals are able to identify
above cost prices as anticompetitive in a reliable manner, a consumer-oriented antitrust policy has no
choice but to adhere to the admittedly underdeterrent below cost pricing requirements of the AreedaTurner or some similar rule.”). If so, it confirms the preoccupation with classification to the detriment
of demonstrable economic effects. What does the evidence show is the economic impact of conduct?
That should be the question – not what is the relationship between price and cost.
107. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1054.
108. Elhauge is of the view that “the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the proposition that
above-cost pricing can be predatory.” Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 318. Circuit courts apparently do not
see that so clearly. See Shores, supra n. 9.
109. See e.g. Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 738 (1981) (for predatory pricing); Easterbrook, supra n. 63 (for antitrust in general); Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 80 (“Yet where the Chicago School tended to advocate per se legality, post-Chicago thinking enthuses over rule of reason
analyses.”); Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1582
(1983) (for mergers); Joskow & Klevorick, supra n. 7 (for predatory pricing); William E. Kovacic &
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 43
(2000); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1977) (for vertical restraints). As Kauper has noted in connection
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The broad teaching of Supreme Court jurisprudence provides a foundation for demonstrable economic effect being a guide to all antitrust
cases.110 Economic theory should not be excluded from consideration,111
but it should not be the “end all, be all.”112 Rule of Reason analysis will
ensure that novel practices, and practices that do not fit into any neat classification, will be captured if they are anticompetitive.113 By focusing on
demonstrable economic effects based on the evidence presented, courts and
juries will be more able to distinguish between anticompetitive low prices
and procompetitive low prices.114
Further, a Rule of Reason approach based on demonstrable economic
effects will give business an opportunity to justify its conduct – prove that
it’s procompetitive – thus increasing certainty and the range of permissible
conduct.115 Though it has been said that “businesses have difficulty documenting and sometimes even articulating efficiencies[,]”116 antitrust law
should be applied so as to require it. After all, business is in the best position to justify its conduct – it decides to engage in it, presumably to make
money. If business cannot justify its conduct on competitive grounds, the
“dog that didn’t bark” may be revealing.

with leveraging and essential facilities doctrine, “greater specificity has come to be viewed by many as
wrongheaded.” Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1626.
110. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459 (Conduct violates Section 2 “only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so.”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1054 (“The broad teaching of
Sylvania is that all antitrust analysis, not merely application of the per se rule in a particular context,
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect.”).
111. See Edlin, supra n. 7, at 943 (Brooke Group elements “may be sufficient to make out a predatory pricing case, but they should not be necessary.”); Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 80 (“We are,
however, convinced that economic knowledge, both theory and evidence, can provide useful guidance
in the design of administrable legal rules. . . .”).
112. See Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 86 (“Economics has not identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for any unilateral practice to be anticompetitive.”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055 (“While
relevant economic theory might be a useful tool in resolving factual issues, it should not displace fact
analysis in the determination of economic effect.”).
113. See Shores, supra n. 9, at 1629 (“[A]ny reformation of standards must deal with the gestalt case,
where liability is based on the cumulative effect of a series of acts, none of which themselves would
satisfy Section Two’s conduct requirement.”).
114. See Edlin, supra n. 7, at 952 (“[T]he challenge for courts has been to find a way to distinguish
anticompetitive low prices from procompetitive low prices.”).
115. Although the Rule of Reason may lack precisely defined boundaries, under it, business has the
opportunity to show, by proof, that conduct is procompetitive. Business need not understand the particularities of the Rule of Reason. See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1535 (2005) (persons operate in ignorance of criminal law, but have a general understanding). To the extent that “[d]istinguishing procompetitive from anticompetitive actions
with certainty is impossible[,]” Rule of Reason analysis will focus on facts – the only conceivable basis
on which to make such distinction with any degree of legitimacy. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 75.
116. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 82.
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Rule of Reason analysis will also limit presumptions in Section 2
cases; presumptions that may not hold any water.117 Also, it could be used
as a tool to mitigate the frequency with which Section 2 cases are brought
for strategic purposes.118 To the extent that plaintiffs would have to present concrete evidence to support a Section 2 claim, rather than simply an
economics expert that can create an issue of fact by arguing about the appropriate measure of cost, a court could more readily evaluate the record
supporting the claim and issue sanctions in appropriate circumstances.
Rule of Reason is the old standby.119 It has been around antitrust law
for nearly one hundred years.120 When all else fails, courts rely on it.121
Thus business and the courts have experience with it and are used to it,122
which is why commentators advocate its use in contexts in which courts
lack experience.123 The Rule of Reason’s pedigree underscores why it
should be used in Section 2 cases.

117. See id. at 82 (arguing that “there should be no presumption on the part of competition authorities
that . . . practices are anticompetitive, even when undertaken by firms with monopoly power”).
118. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. &
Econ. 247 (1985); Crane, supra n. 30, at 8; Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1624 (Since Section 2 cases are likely
to be brought by competitors, “one could argue that the cases themselves are potentially anticompetitive.”).
119. See e.g. FTC v. Ind. Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (applying rule of reason
instead of per se rule when the restraint’s effect is not immediately ascertainable).
120. Stand. Oil, 221 U.S. 1.
121. See Broad. Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979) (explaining when Rule of Reason will apply); Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law 143 (Law. ed., West 1985) (same);
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75
Yale L.J. 373, 464 (1966) (same).
122. See e.g. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343-44 (noting Court conclusively presumes restraint unreasonable when experience allows confident prediction Rule of Reason would condemn); Ernest Gellhorn,
Antitrust Law and Economics In A Nutshell 6-9 (1976) (historical development of Rule of Reason);
Peter Nealis, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust Adjudication Under the Rule of Reason, 61
Ohio St. L.J. 347 (2000); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A
New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1991) (noting that courts have
significant experience with the Rule of Reason in vertical contexts); but see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 Vand. L.
Rev. 1753, 1754 (1994) (opining that “the modern rule of reason has no substantive content” and that
because plaintiffs are reluctant to bring rule of reason suits, the federal courts have little experience in
applying it).
123. See e.g. Jennifer L. Dauer, Political Boycotts: Protected by the Political Action Exception to
Antitrust Liability or Illegal Per Se?, 28 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 1273, 1307-08 (1995) (noting that courts
could easily apply Rule of Reason to mixed-motive boycotts since courts have extensive experience
with Rule of Reason); Charles D. Marvin, Baseball’s Unilaterally Imposed Salary Cap: This Baseball
Cap Doesn’t Fit, 43 Kan. L. Rev. 625 (1995) (challenge to baseball’s salary cap likely to be evaluated
under the Rule of Reason); Howard Morse, Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes in the Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Industries: Antitrust Rules, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 359, 361, 367 (2002)
(arguing for a rule of reason approach because courts lack experience with exclusion payments).
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V. CONCLUSION
Predatory pricing law, in its current form, relies too heavily on economic theory to the exclusion of competitive facts.124 As a result, predatory pricing claims have almost been read out of the antitrust laws.125 But
the current predatory pricing standard does not deliver on its promises of
certainty or enhancing competition.126
Commentators have for a long time suggested that modern theory will
solve the riddle of Section 2, but “we have seen very little progress in the
theoretical literature that would help regulators and courts separate procompetitive from anticompetitive behavior.”127 The lack of progress flows
from too much complication. Courts and commentators should refocus on
Sherman Act fundamentals, for as Justice Holmes explained: “The life of
the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”128 If the Sherman Act
is the “Magna Carta of free enterprise,”129 and “[i]f the goal of antitrust is
consumer welfare, then the inquiry should focus on that goal, not on
whether a firm is maximizing profits in the short run.”130 The appropriate
tool for conducting such an inquiry is the Rule of Reason. Although predatory pricing law – and the law governing Section 2 generally – may be a
‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ enterprise[,]”131 the damning
should be a function of evidence, where business has the full opportunity
to justify the procompetitive results of its conduct, not on theory.

124. See Shores, supra n. 9, at 1056 (opining that “the Court has gone too far in determining economic effect by relying on abstract economic principles.”).
125. See id. at 1085.
126. See e.g. Crane, supra n. 30, at 44 (“The structure of predatory pricing law does not provide
business executives a high degree of certainty about the legal reception of price cuts.”); Edlin, supra n.
7, at 941 (“Brooke Group was no great day for consumers, for well-functioning markets, or for antitrust
law.”).
127. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 98 (referencing Kovacic & Shapiro, supra n. 109, at 58-59).
128. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
129. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 415.
130. Edlin, supra n. 7, at 978.
131. Crane, supra n. 30, at 65.

